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INTRODUCTION
Christina Aguilera’s hit song, “Beautiful,” topped the international music charts,1 won the 2003 Grammy Award for “Best Female Pop Vocal Performance,”2 and received international critical
acclaim for its lyrics about self-acceptance and inner beauty.3 Aguilera earned a GLAAD Media Award,4 and Stonewall, a UK-based
LGBT-rights organization, labeled it the number one most empowering song of the decade.5 As the track’s recording artist, Aguilera’s financial gains reflected the song’s success when her album
sold more than 4.3 million copies.6 The same can’t be said, however, for Linda Perry—the woman who wrote and published the hit.7
In one fiscal quarter of 2012, Pandora played “Beautiful” approximately 12.7 million times and yet Perry made less than $350 dollars in streaming royalties.8 While record labels and recording art1

See Christina Aguilera―Chart History, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/
artist/299251/christina-aguilera/chart?page=1&f=379 [http://perma.cc/F3TM-9MPV]
(last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (“Beautiful” peaked at number two on the Billboard Hot 100 in
the United States); see also Stripped―Christina Aguilera, ALLMUSIC,
http://www.allmusic.com/album/stripped-mw0000662221
[http://perma.cc/98YJ9PSF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (showing that “Beautiful” reached the top spot on the
Canadian Singles Chart).
2
See Christina Aguilera, RECORDING ACADEMY, http://www.grammy.com/artist/
christina-aguilera [http://perma.cc/9R5Q-BSDR] (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
3
See, e.g., MARY ANNE DONOVAN, CHRISTINA AGUILERA: A BIOGRAPHY 58 (2010)
(discussing the singer’s critical acclaim for “Beautiful” in comparison with her other
songs).
4
See MARGARET R. MEAD, CHRISTINA AGUILERA 10 (2012). GLAAD stands for Gay
& Lesbian Allegiance Against Defamation. Id.
5
See Christina Aguilera’s ‘Beautiful’ Named Most Empowering Pop Song, STAR PULSE
(Apr. 8, 2011, 10:32 AM) http://www.starpulse.com/news/index.php/2011/04/08/
christina_aguileras_beautiful_named_mo [http://perma.cc/K65E-N8NR].
6
See Gary Trust, Ask Billboard: Taylor Swift Out-‘Shake’s Mariah Carey, BILLBOARD
(Sept. 1, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chartbeat/6236538/ask-billboard-taylor-swift-out-shakes-mariah-carey
[http://perma.cc/X5KV-4QYF] (noting that the song “Beautiful” has been digitally
purchased more than 1.5 million times.); see also DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 58 (noting
that Aguilera was the number one Billboard Female Artist in 2003 for both the album and
its singles with an overall total of twelve million copies sold worldwide).
7
See Songwriting and Production, LINDA PERRY, http://www.lindaperry.com
[http://perma.cc/JZV5-BMPL] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“Christina Aguilera—
‘Beautiful’—Written & Produced by L. Perry”).
8
Perry’s paycheck was for a mere $349.16; songwriters earn approximately eight
cents for every thousand times Pandora plays one of their songs. See Burt Bacharach,
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ists receive up to ninety-seven percent of a song’s revenue through
royalties when the song streams over “new media,”9 such as Internet radio services like Pandora or Spotify, songwriters are often
paid as little as three percent.10 The inequality in compensation between recording artists and songwriters has never been as extreme
as it is today.11
Songwriters are paid through Performing Rights Organizations
(“PROs”).12 These organizations negotiate license agreements for
the use of songs, collect any royalties the works generate, and then

What the Songwriting World Needs Now, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:12 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304603704579325053186123012
[http://perma.cc/FQD7-MK2E].
9
See Bailey Socha & Barbara Eber-Schmid, What is New Media?, NEW MEDIA INST.,
http://www.newmedia.org/what-is-new-media.html
[http://perma.cc/4ZSW-SZSN]
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“New Media is a 21st Century catchall term used to define all
that is related to the Internet and the interplay between technology, images, and
sound.”).
10
The International Council of Music Authors published the “Study Concerning Fair
Compensation for Music Creators in the Digital Age” in 2014 to address the issue of
compensation inequality for music copyright holders with respect to digital streaming
services. See Pierre-E. Lalonde, Study Concerning Fair Compensation for Music Creators in
the Digital Age, INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSIC AUTHORS (Oct. 22–23, 2014),
http://www.ciamcreators.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CIAM14-1172_Study_fair_
compensation_2014-05-01_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/G2S4-T3T6]. A main conclusion
of the study was that while major record labels are paid up to ninety-seven percent of
digital streaming revenues, songwriters, music publishers, and other rights holders and
administrators share “as little as 3%.” Id. at 3. The study labeled the revenue split
between recording artists and songwriters as “grossly inequitable.” Id.; see also Rick
Carnes, Developing a Copyright System That Works for Songwriters, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
309, 313 (2015) (noting that songwriters are “suffering deeply unfair financial
discrimination” due to the current revenue split for digital streaming services).
11
The introduction of digital streaming services has significantly widened the gap in
compensation inequality. With respect to “mechanical royalties,” songwriters receive
9.1% of a song sale’s revenue. This covers “physical phonorecords” (i.e. physical copies
of the sound recording, such as when a consumer purchases a compact disc) or
“permanent downloads” (such as when a consumer downloads an MP3 of a sound
recording). See Mechanical License Royalty Rates, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD,
http://www.copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf [http://perma.cc/5M55-AEP4] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also infra Parts I, II. As previously mentioned, songwriters make
as little as three percent with respect to digital streaming services. See Lalonde, supra note
10.
12
Three major performing rights organizations exist in the United States: the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”); Broadcast Music,
Inc. (“BMI”); and SESAC, Inc.
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distribute the royalties back to the songwriters.13 In the 1940s, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigated the two largest PROs
in the United States for allegedly engaging in anti-competitive conduct.14 To avoid the threat of prosecution, both organizations
signed governmental consent decrees establishing various licensing
requirements and restrictions.15 The decrees have not been updated, however, in more than fifteen years.16 Neither decree has
been revised to account for the introduction of digital technology,
including the recent advent of Internet radio. Consequently, these
antiquated decrees restrict the organizations’ ability to secure reasonable licensing rates for performance rights in new media. As the
music licensing system stands, record companies and recording
artists are making considerably more money than their counterparts in songwriting, composing, and publishing, with respect to
new media services.17
13

Michael R. Cohen, 25B WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 23:22
(2014) (“Since it would be virtually impossible for publishers or songwriters to monitor
and control the large numbers of users of their songs, the enforcement and control of such
performance rights usually falls to one of three performing rights organizations . . . .”).
14
See, e.g., Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of
the Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1998) (detailing how and why the
two largest domestic PROs—ASCAP and BMI—entered into governmental consent
decrees).
15
The government often settles civil antitrust litigation outside of trial by having
defendants enter into a consent decree to remedy the alleged anti-competitive conduct.
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Civ. Action No. 411395 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2001) (Second Amended Final Judgment), [hereinafter
ASCAP Consent Decree]; United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 64-Civ-3787
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994) (Amended Final Judgment), [hereinafter BMI Consent
Decree]; see also JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 4:8 (2d ed.).
16
The ASCAP Consent Decree was last updated in 2001, whereas BMI’s was last
updated in 1994. See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra
note 15.
17
Taylor Swift pulled her newest album, 1989, from Spotify out of fear that allowing
free listening through the service would hurt sales. See Doug Gross, Songwriters: Spotify
Doesn’t Pay Off . . . Unless You’re a Taylor Swift, CNN (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:58 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/tech/web/spotify-pay-musicians [http://perma.cc/
Y9ER-BNR8]. She was on track, however, to make approximately six million dollars in
2014 from allowing her songs to play on the platform. Id. Comparatively, the songwriters
of Jon Bon Jovi’s famed hit, “Livin’ on a Prayer” made only $110.00 for more than 6.5
million plays on the same platform. Id.
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In order to guarantee reasonable fees for songwriters, composers, and publishers, the consent decrees18 must undergo critical
reform to account for how music is licensed in new media.19 Part I
of this Note will provide background on the mechanics of music
licensing, both traditional and through modern mediums, in order
to explain why the two largest PROs initially entered into governmental consent decrees. Part II will discuss recent judicial determinations of “reasonable” licensing rates for public performances in
new media and demonstrate the discrepancy in compensation between songwriters and their sound recording counterparts, namely
record companies and recording artists. Finally, Part III will argue
that the solution to this problem is through consent decree reform.
The decrees should be modified to allow songwriters to withdraw
their digital rights in order to separately license songs in new media. A new PRO should then emerge in the market place to account
solely for public performance rights in new media, leaving traditional licensing to the existing PROs. Additionally, the current
judicial process for setting rates, known as the “rate court” system, should be replaced with expedited, binding arbitration. Making these important changes to the music-licensing system will
work towards bridging the gap in compensation inequality between
songwriters and recording artists.
I. BACKGROUND: THE MECHANICS OF MUSIC LICENSING
A. Copyrighting Music
Copyright protection is at the core of music licensing and has
evolved over time with the technological developments in music

18

The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees are substantially similar. This Note will
address making substantive changes to both decrees and will refer to them collectively as
“the consent decrees.” The Antitrust Division of the DOJ solicited public comments on
reforming the decrees in 2014 and is currently considering modification. See ANTITRUST
CONSENT DECREE REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi-decree-review.html [http://perma.cc/M8AA-YW3L] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
19
For ease of reference, the types of artists represented by PROs (namely songwriters,
lyricists, composers, and publishers) will be referred to in this Note collectively as
“songwriters.”
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distribution.20 Under the United States Constitution, Congress has
the authority to pass legislation to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” by providing authors and inventors with
exclusive rights to their works for a limited period of time.21 Although the first federal copyright act passed in 1790, the only way
songwriters could legally protect their work at the time was by
physically printing the composition on paper and then copyrighting
the paper as a “book.”22 The term “musical compositions” was
not added to the list of statutorily protected works until Congress
amended the copyright legislation in 1831.23
Decades later, in 1897, further legislative reform allowed for the
protection of “public performances” of musical compositions,
namely when someone other than the copyright holder performs
the work in a public or private venue.24 As technology evolved and
these performances could be recorded and distributed through
“phonorecords,” Congress accordingly amended the law again in
1909 to account for “mechanical” reproductions of music.25 Consequently, there is a legal distinction between “musical works” and
“sound recordings” and the type of protection each musical category is granted under modern copyright law.
The most recent major reform of U.S. copyright law occurred
in 1976 with the Copyright Act, and the legislation remains largely
unchanged to date.26 Eight types of “works of authorship” are expressly listed as receiving protection, two of which are “musical
20

See generally COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.
(Feb. 2015), http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-musicmarketplace.pdf [http://perma.cc/44KE-W4GE] [hereinafter MUSIC MARKETPLACE].
21
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22
See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999,
1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (“A book within the statute need not be a book in the common
and ordinary acceptation of the word . . . it may be printed only on one sheet, as the words
of a song or the music accompanying it.”).
23
See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
24
See Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right
of Public Performance for Musical Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1158
(2007) (providing a comprehensive history of how public performances gained copyright
protection in the 1880’s and noting “the right to exclusive public performance of a
musical composition was established by statute in 1897”).
25
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075–76.
26
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006); see also Kurt E. Kruckeberg, Copyright “Band-AIDS”
and the Future of Reform, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2011).
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works” and “sound recordings.”27 The “musical works” classification pertains to the song’s composition and any accompanying
lyrics, as created by the songwriter and/or publisher.28 Conversely,
a “sound recording” is an individual performance of the “musical
work” recorded in a fixed medium, such as a compact disc (“CD”)
or digital MP3 file.29 These two forms of authorship, although both
included in the “musical works” category, receive different copyright protections and can be owned collectively by one party, or
individually by separate parties.30
Copyright holders of “musical works” obtain certain exclusive
rights, including the right to authorize others to make reproductions of their work.31 Known as the “mechanical right,” this includes such methods of reproduction as reprinting sheet music of
the composition or creating a CD.32 Copyright holders of “musical
works” can also authorize others to create derivatives of their
work, such as writing a new song based on the original composition
or creating a musical arrangement containing the work.33 Although
a “synchronization right” is not expressly listed in the Copyright
Act, it is an accepted form of derivative work within the music industry.34 It involves synchronizing a musical work in timed relation
to another medium, such as setting a song to audiovisual material
27

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural works.”); see also Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments
of Public Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, but
Who Gets Paid?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (providing an in-depth explanation
of the difference between “musical works” and “sound recordings”).
28
Id.
29
17 U.S.C. § 114.
30
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 18.
31
17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
32
See id.; MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 34.
33
17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see also COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Oct. 2013), http://copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf [http://perma
.cc/4BNV-VZ77].
34
17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see, e.g., Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors
& Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The ‘synch’ right is a form of the
reproduction right also created by statute as one of the exclusive rights enjoyed by the
copyright owner.”).
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to create a music video.35 Copyright holders can also authorize public display of a musical work, such as printing song lyrics in an advertisement or posting them to a webpage.36 The right to perform a
work publicly, either live or by broadcasting a recording, is known
as the “public performance right” and is the main focus of this
Note.37
The copyright owner of a “sound recording” was not originally
entitled to any type of performance right.38 This changed with the
1995 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
(“DPRSRA”), which added a new exclusive right known as the
“digital performance right.”39 The change was enacted in response
to how music users were consuming music in relation to emerging
technology (i.e., listening to streaming services online rather than
actually purchasing physical copies or downloads of songs).40 Consequently, copyright owners of sound recordings now have many of
the same exclusive rights under the Copyright Act as those owning
“musical works,” including the right to make or distribute copies
and/or to create derivative works.41 If, for example, Prince’s hit
song, “Stand Back” plays over digital radio, Stevie Nicks is entitled to collect royalties for the performance right because she
wrote it.42 Thanks to the DPRSA, Prince and his record label can
also collect royalties for the digital performance right because he is
the featured artist on the track.43

35

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 25.
See id.; see also AL & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 692–93 (4th ed. 2010);
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
37
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
38
See Eric M. Jenniges, Waves of Concern: Copyright Issues in Satellite Radio, 22 GA. ST.
U.L. REV. 969, 973 (2006).
39
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 4,
109 Stat. 336, 344–48; see, e.g., Tomomi Harkey, Bonneville International Corp. v. Peters:
Considering Copyright Rules to Facilitate Licensing for Webcasting, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
625, 633–36 (2005) (outlining the evolution of the “digital performance right”).
40
See Jenniges, supra note 38, at 973–74.
41
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3), (6).
42
See Tia Williams, Wait, Who Wrote That? 15 Shocking Songwriters Behind Pop Hits,
VH1 (Mar. 27, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.vh1.com/celebrity/2013-03-27/surprisingsongwriters [http://perma.cc/7YF2-PTZJ].
43
Id.
36
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The chart below demonstrates the type of licenses generally required for common forms of music usage:
Music
Usage
Creating
a CD
MP3
Distribution
Internet
Radio
Karaoke
Live
Performance
Music Video
Printing
Sheet Music
Publishing
Song Lyrics
Ringtones
Traditional
AM/FM
Radio44
Use in Film
Use in
Television
44

Required License(s)
Mechanical
SynchroPublic
Digital
(a.k.a. Print) nization Performance Performance

•
•

•
•

•
•

•

•
•
•
•

•

•
•

•
No license required in the United States

•

•
•

•
•

Transmitting a musical work over radio is considered exempt from copyright
infringement and thus does not require the payment of royalties because such
performances are deemed to be “promotional tools” used to drive sales. Copyright law
has a “non-subscription broadcast” exception. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)(iii); see also
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 485 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[S]tatutory
exemption of ‘nonsubscription broadcast transmissions’ from digital audio transmission
performance copyright coverage does not cover station’s simultaneous Internet streaming
of its AM/FM broadcast signals.”). Even after the 1995 DPRSRA, traditional and radio
broadcasters continue to perform sound recordings without having to pay royalties for
digital performance rights “even if they convert their signal to digital form.” ROBERT P.
MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 574–78 (4th ed.
2006).
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B. The Multifaceted Licensing Process
As a result of having two separate types of musical works and
various exclusive rights attached to each under the law, there are
numerous ways in which such works can be licensed.45 The music
industry relies on a variety of different organizations and entities to
license these works and thus to administer the respective rights and
royalties.46 As previously mentioned, the “public performance
right” for musical works first gained legal protection in 1897.47
Even at a time when publicly performing a song was the only way in
which a copyright holder could derive profit from this right (in
comparison to modern day where songs can be broadcast through
multiple mediums to constitute a public performance), the “sheer
number and fleeting nature” of such public performances made it
extremely difficult for copyright owners to negotiate individually
with each user or to detect possible infringement.48 Resultantly,
PROs were established to simplify the process and address the logistical issue of having each performance venue negotiate separately with each copyright holder.49 The first major PRO, the American
Society of Composers and Music Publishers (“ASCAP”), was established in 1914.50 Two others, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”)51
and SESAC, Inc. (“SESAC”),52 were created in the 1930s. Today,

45

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 18 (noting that the “musical work” and
“sound recording” are separately protected works of authorship and can thus be
separately owned and licensed under copyright law).
46
Id. at 32.
47
See Rosen, supra note 24.
48
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 32.
49
See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[T]here are far too many musical works . . . to make it realistic to undertake individual
negotiations; and as to some works, the copyright holder may not be identified easily.”).
50
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Comment Letter
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PH2C-F8ZX] [hereinafter ASCAP Comment].
51
BMI was created in 1939. See Broadcast Music, Inc., Comment Letter on Review of
Consent Decree in United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/advocacy/bmi_public_comments_to_doj.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UEQ6-JHKV] [hereinafter BMI Comment].
52
See About Us, SESAC, http://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx [http://perma.cc/
6XCC-PYSJ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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the three PRO repertories account for the licensing of nearly every
copyrighted musical composition in the United States.53
Traditionally, the music licensing process was fairly
straightforward. Songwriters would join a PRO, which would negotiate license agreements with various venues for the use of their
music, including entities such as bars, restaurants, live performance venues, and television stations (in order to use songs in programming and commercials).54 The PROs would then collect the
fees generated by any public performances and distribute the money back to the songwriters.55 The process has since become more
complicated, however, with the advent of technology and the corresponding creation of new mediums for broadcasting music. Today, for example, an Internet radio service must be licensed in order for consumers to play any copyrighted songs.56
To address varying needs, PROs provide different types of licenses.57 Collective Licenses, known as Blanket Licenses, are the
most common type and allow a licensee to perform all of the songs
in the particular PRO’s repertory an unlimited amount of times
and for a fixed fee.58 This type of license is common for venues like
bars, restaurants, retail stores, and television stations.59 Perprogram or per-segment licenses (“PPL”) also authorize the use of
all songs, but are effectively a discount off the Blanket License.60
The licensee is authorized to use all songs in the PRO’s repertory
for specific programs or parts of programming, in exchange for a
flat fee or percentage of that program’s advertising revenue.61 The
53

See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 188. Individuals and entities are still free,
however, to obtain “direct licenses” straight from the copyright holder and/or “source
licenses” sold directly from the song’s producer. Id. at 190.
54
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 20.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 190; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
59
See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 189–90.
60
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 157 F.R.D. 173,
178 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
61
Id. (“[The PPL] amounts to a mini-blanket license in that it permits the licensee to
use as much ASCAP music as it wishes . . . [while] . . . pay[ing] fees only for those
programs that actually use such ASCAP music.”).
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PPL requires more detailed reporting information, such as specifying the music selected, the usage dates and program-specific information.62
When previews for Universal Pictures’ Fifty Shades of Grey
played on television, for example, each station that featured the
advertisement needed to ensure that the songs included in the preview were within its licensing agreements. One of the trailers featured Beyoncé’s “Haunted,” and because she is a member of
ASCAP, the stations were required to have some type of ASCAP
licensing agreement in place.63
Whereas PROs are charged with the public performance right
with respect to “musical works,” a separate entity covers the right
for “sound recordings.”64 Copyright holders for sound recordings
are entitled to public performance royalties, but only for digital audio transmissions.65 This includes Internet services that “stream”
or “webcast” music, meaning a platform that allows a user to listen
to a song without leaving a useable copy on his or her computer.66
These transmissions are then licensed differently, according to
whether they are transmitted through interactive or non-interactive
streaming services.67 A section 114 statutory license applies to noninteractive digital music services, such as free and paid Internet
radio services.68 Royalty rates and terms for such licenses are handled by the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”), which is comprised
of three administrative judges appointed by the Librarian of Con-

62

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 33.
See, e.g., ASCAP Members Win Big at the Grammys, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/playback/2015/02/action/2015-ascap-grammy-winners
[http://perma.cc/8ZXC-27PZ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (noting that Beyoncé won three
Grammys, the most of any ASCAP member in 2015).
64
See
About,
SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/about
[http://perma.cc/B3SR-2U2P] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
65
See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
§ 4, 109 Stat. 336.
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f), (g) (2006).
67
See id. §§ 112, 114.
68
It also applies to “preexisting” satellite radio services and music subscription
services, meaning those that existed prior to July 1, 1998. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), (c).
Sirius XM is the only preexisting satellite service, and Music Choice and Muzak are the
only preexisting subscription services. See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 49.
63
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gress.69 Similarly, a section 112 statutory license addresses server
reproductions of such sound recordings, known as “ephemeral recordings,” and is also governed by the CRB.70 Limitations on these
licenses include not being able to announce in advance a schedule
of songs that will be played, nor the ability to play a certain song
more than a specified number of times in a particular time limit.71
The CRB does not, however, function as a PRO to collect and
distribute royalties.72 The Recording Industry Association of
America created a non-profit PRO called SoundExchange in
2000.73 It became an independent entity in 2003 and is designated
by the U.S. Copyright Office to “collect and distribute digital performance royalties” for all digital audio transmissions of sound recordings.74 The Copyright Act specifies royalty distribution in section 114: 50% to the copyright owner of the sound recording, 45% to
the recording artist, 2.5% to an agent representing non-featured vocalists on the record, and 2% to an agent representing the featured
vocalists.75 Under section 112, royalties go directly to the sound
recording’s copyright owner.76 The distinction between interactive
and non-interactive (i.e., radio-style) services has, however, been
the subject of considerable debate. Section 114 provides that a service is interactive if it allows the user to access the transmission of
a program “specifically created for the recipient,” or the transmission of a recording “which is selected by or on behalf of the reci-

69

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801–805; see also Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341.
70
See 17 U.S.C. § 112; see also 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:63
(2014) (defining “ephemeral recordings” as “copies or phonorecords of a work made for
purposes of later transmission by a broadcasting organization legally entitled to transmit
the work”).
71
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(B)–(C).
72
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 47.
73
Id.
74
SoundExchange deducts its costs before distributing royalties. See id.; see also Erich
Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 Rate
Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 268 (2008).
75
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2); see also About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties/
[http://perma.cc/7SUL-A55T] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
76
See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e).
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pient.”77 In Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., a group of
record companies filed suit against a webcasting service providing
an Internet radio platform to listeners.78 The action challenged
whether the radio service, which provided users with “individualized radio stations” created based on the users’ listening habits
and the user’s ratings of songs and artists, was interactive within
the meaning of the statute.79 Although users of the service are not
directly able to select songs, the court considered whether or not
the service could be considered “specially created” for the user
based on the rating-scheme.80 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the service was not “interactive,”
because the webcasting service did “not provide sufficient control
to users such that playlists are so predictable that users will choose
to listen to the webcast in lieu of purchasing music.”81 As a result
of the ruling, Internet radio services such as Pandora are able to
obtain statutory licenses as noninteractive services for public performances of sound recordings.82
Every five years, the CRB conducts rate-setting procedures for
sections 112 and 114 statutory licenses.83 These rates are appealable
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.84 To facilitate voluntary industry agreements, the CRB first
allows parties to negotiate and attempt to reach a settlement.85 The
CRB can then accept the settlement either partially or in full, or
proceed to conduct its own rate-setting determination in the event
that the parties cannot reach an agreement.86 Services that don’t
fall under sections 112 or 114, and are thus “interactive,” must obtain direct licenses from copyright holders, which are negotiated

77

See id. § 114(j)(7).
578 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2009).
79
Id. at 149–50; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7).
80
See Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 161.
81
The Second Circuit noted Congress’ intent in making the distinction was to ensure
that services which ran the risk of diminishing record sales be subject to stricter licensing
arrangements. Id. at 162.
82
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 49.
83
See 17 U.S.C. § 804(b).
84
See id. § 803(d)(1).
85
See id. § 803(b)(1)–(3).
86
See id. §§ 801(b)(7), 803(b)(6).
78
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independently from the CRB.87 Consequently, the terms of such
licenses can be vastly different from those reached under statutory
agreements.88 This allows record companies to negotiate for incentives such as fee advances and company stock as contract consideration.89
The chart below demonstrates the many facets of the music licensing process. The performance rights categories are highlighted
in yellow as they are the focus of this Note:

C. Governmental Intervention: ASCAP & BMI’s Consent Decrees
ASCAP and BMI, the two largest American PROs, are subject
to governmental oversight through the form of consent decrees.90
A consent decree is an agreement between the government and a

87

See id. § 114(d)(3)(C).
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 52.
89
Major record companies collectively received eighteen percent of Spotify shares as
consideration in negotiating direct licensing agreements for the interactive service. See
Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major Labels Love Spotify,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2009/
aug/17/major-labels-spotify [http://perma.cc/7VLR-FMPN]; see also Hannah Karp,
Artists Press for Their Share, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
artists-press-for-their-share-1405905178 [http://perma.cc/5MAL-25B4] (noting that
Google, Inc. paid Warner Music Group an advance of $400 million to license the label’s
free YouTube site and a paid YouTube subscription service, which had not yet been
released).
90
See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; see also BMI Consent Decree, supra note
15.
88
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party accused of committing some type of unlawful conduct.91 The
party accused of committing the unlawful conduct signs the decree,
and thus agrees to its terms, without admitting liability.92 This type
of agreement has the same “force and effect” as any other judgment.93 The DOJ distinguishes between two types of consent decrees: “perpetual final judgments,” which are namely consent decrees entered into before 1979, and decrees with “sunset provisions,” which are post-1979 decrees that automatically terminate
on a certain date.94
ASCAP started as a non-profit in 1914 and its repertory grew
substantially in the 1920s when the radio started broadcasting music.95 A second PRO, SESAC, was established in 1930 as a forprofit entity but remained small and did not pose substantial competition in the industry.96 Consequently, the radio industry created
BMI, a third PRO, as direct competition for ASCAP in 1939.97 For
many years, ASCAP and BMI only offered blanket licenses to their
repertoires and had the exclusive rights to their members’ public
performance rights, prohibiting members from negotiating any direct licensing agreements.98 Soon, however, the DOJ grew concerned that the PROs were engaging in anticompetitive conduct
and initiated antitrust proceedings against both organizations.99
In 1941, the DOJ filed a complaint against ASCAP, alleging that
its blanket license was an illegal restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, “eliminating competition among ASCAP’s
91

See 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 1149 (2015).
See id.
93
See id.; see, e.g., Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir.
2014).
94
Modern consent decrees typically terminate within ten years. See ANTITRUST
DIVISION MANUAL III-146, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. (5th ed. 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [http://perma.cc/WKQ4-69S6] (last
visited Sept. 26, 2015).
95
See Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 349, 354 (2001).
96
See id.
97
See id.; see also BMI Comment, supra note 51 (discussing the history of BMI).
98
See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 35–36.
99
See id. at 36; see, e.g., United States v. Broad. Music Inc., 1966 Tr. Cas. (CCH) ¶
71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (settling the dispute by consent decree); United States v. Am.
Soc’y Composers, Authors & Publishers (United States v. ASCAP), 1941 Tr. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (settling the matter by consent decree).
92
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member-affiliates and allowing them to fix prices for their music.”100 Rather than conceding liability, ASCAP agreed to enter
into a non-sunset provision “perpetual final judgment” consent
decree.101 The decree imposed three requirements: (1) to offer a
PPL as an alternative to the blanket license; (2) to allow broadcasters to enter into license agreements, upon request; and (3) to allow
membership to any artist who had composed at least one musical
work.102
The decree was amended in 1950 in response to two lawsuits,
each involving music licensing for movie theatres. In the first, Alden-Rochelle v. ASCAP,103 164 plaintiffs operating more than 200
movie theatres brought suit against ASCAP, alleging violations of
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,104 for restraint of trade
and monopolistic conduct. ASCAP had entered into agreements
with its members that prohibited them from assigning their performing rights directly to movie producers instead of forcing them
to go through the PRO.105 Further, the agreements with movie distributors only allowed a film, with ASCAP licensed material to be
shown for profit in theatres that also held ASCAP licenses.106 The
Court boldly held that “[a]lmost every part of the [ASCAP] structure, almost all of [ASCAP]’s activities in licensing motion picture
theatres, involve a violation of the anti-trust laws.”107 The plaintiffs
were awarded injunctive relief.108
The second case, M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, was conversely
brought by members of ASCAP against a group of movie thea100

See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 197–98 (2014) (providing a
history of the early antitrust litigation against ASCAP). Price-fixing agreements, whereby
competing sellers agree to maintain the same prices, are per se violations of the Sherman
Act. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (“The
anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.”).
101
See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 197.
102
United States v. Am. Soc’y of Authors, Composers & Publishers, 870 F. Supp 1211,
1212–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing United States v. ASCAP, 1941 Tr. Cas. (CCH), ¶ 56,104).
103
80 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), amended by 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
104
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2004).
105
Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 891.
106
Id. at 892.
107
Id. at 893.
108
Id. at 900.
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tres.109 The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief against
the theatres for showing films featuring their material without first
obtaining an ASCAP blanket license.110 The Court denied relief on
the grounds that ASCAP was violating both sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and thus, even the plaintiffs were violating antitrust
law.111
The first amendment to ASCAP’s decree, which occurred in
1950, added a provision of particular importance to this Note.112 It
provided that, if ASCAP and one of its licensees could not reach an
agreement with respect to setting a rate, the licensee could apply
for a “rate court” proceeding for a judicial determination of a reasonable fee, with ASCAP bearing the burden of proof as to reasonableness.113 BMI did not sign its consent decree until 1966, but the
decree’s creation followed a similar path as ASCAP’s.114 The decree’s terms are virtually identical and also provide for judicial rate
setting, with BMI also bearing the burden of proof as to reasonableness.115
Despite both PROs entering into consent decrees with nearly
identical terms, parties continued to bring antitrust challenges
based on the propensity of blanket licenses. In 1975, Columbia
Broadcasting System sued ASCAP, BMI, and all respective members and affiliates.116 Although the district court upheld the blanket
109

80 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Minn. 1948).
Id.
111
Id. at 850.
112
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. Civ. A.
42-245, 1950 WL 42273, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950).
113
These “rate courts” sit in the Southern District of New York. See id; see also
Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 198 (2014).
114
For a historical detail of BMI’s path towards signing its DOJ consent decree as well
as further background on both decrees, see Janet L. Avery, The Struggle over Performing
Rights to Music: BMI and ASCAP vs. Cable Television, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 47,
49 (1991).
115
BMI’s consent decree also requires granting PPLs as an alternative to blanket
licenses, admitting any songwriter with more than one published work, and prohibiting
the prevention of direct licensing. It was amended in 1994 to allow either BMI or its
licensees to apply to the rate court for a judicial determination of a reasonable fee. See
United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 WL 901652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1994); BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15.
116
See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
400 F. Supp. 737, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
110
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licenses, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they constituted
illegal price fixing and were a per se violation of federal antitrust
law.117 The Supreme Court reversed again, however, agreeing with
the district court that blanket licenses were a practical solution to
an incredibly complex marketplace where thousands of copyright
holders and millions of compositions must be efficiently licensed.118
On remand, the Second Circuit held that the blanket licenses were
not anti-competitive because viable alternatives, such as the PPL,
were guaranteed to licensees through the two consent decrees.119
The third American PRO, SESAC, is considerably smaller than
both ASCAP and BMI and operates as a for-profit entity owned
fully by investors.120 Although information is not publicly reported,
SESAC is understood to have a market share in the single digit
range.121 SESAC faced its first antitrust dispute in 2014 when fifty
local television stations filed a class action lawsuit against the
PRO.122 The plaintiffs argued it was unfeasible to avoid obtaining
licenses for SESAC’s repertory because its body of musical works
had grown so large and included many “ubiquitous” songs that
these compositions were inevitably among those the TV shows the
stations wanted to air.123 The plaintiffs further contended that
SESAC did not offer a viable alternative to its blanket license, as
117

See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
118
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
119
See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers,
Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding the blanket license is not a
restraint on trade because viable alternatives, such as PLLs and direct licensing, exist);
Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991)
(holding a “realistically available alternative” to the blanket license exists).
120
See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
121
See In re Application of MobiTv, Inc. (MobiTV I), 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d sub nom. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v.
MobiTV, Incorporation (MobiTV II), 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012).
122
See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 185–86.
123
From 1995 to 2000, SESAC offered an industry-wide blanket license to television
stations. The license was extended from 2001 to 2004 but included a provision that any
disputes would be settled through arbitration. In 2005, when negotiations couldn’t be
reached with the stations, SESAC started negotiating individually with licensees. The
new licenses increased in price by ten percent and modified the PLL alternative.
Consequently, no station continued with a PLL prior to the lawsuit, compared with 180
stations that used it in 2005. Id. at 186, 190–94.
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the cost of obtaining a PPL had drastically increased and the PRO
imposed penalties for engaging in direct licensing.124 In October
2014, SESAC entered into a settlement agreement with the stations.125 Terms included the payment of $58.5 million to the television stations and for SESAC to include a viable PPL as an alternative to the blanket license, beginning in 2016.126
II. THE “RATE COURTS”: SETTING “REASONABLE” RATES
TO LICENSE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN NEW MEDIA
According to both ASCAP and BMI’s consent decrees, parties
can request a judicial determination of rates if they cannot reach a
negotiated agreement.127 Although the “rate court” system has
been in place for decades, it was not until recent years that it became a commonly used venue.128 With the advent of new media, an
increasing number of license-seekers have relied upon judicial rate
setting.129 These parties have taken claims to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York
(“S.D.N.Y.”) (and some, on appeal, to the Second Circuit) to seek
rate court intervention in setting licensing fees with both ASCAP
and BMI.130 Consequently, the S.D.N.Y. has been instrumental in
deciding what a “reasonable” license fee should be in the online
world.131
124

Id. at 192–93.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement at 1–2, 5, Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 180.
126
The S.D.N.Y. approved the settlement in February 2015. Approximately $16 million
was designated towards reimbursing attorneys fees and expenses while the remaining
$42.5 million was allocated to the local stations in the settlement class as compensation
for the “alleged overcharges they paid since 2008.” See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC,
87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
127
See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15.
128
Prior to 2000, ASCAP had only experienced seven rate court proceedings. BMI’s
first proceeding was in 2001. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting
Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 310 (2009).
129
See Todd Brabec & Jeffrey Brabec, Online Music Licensing, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1,
35 (2011); see also United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. (Music Choice II), 316 F.3d 189, 194
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting that BMI’s first rate court case to appeal to the Second Circuit was
in 2003).
130
See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 129, at 35.
131
Id.
125
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The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees do not expressly define
“reasonable” or the process by which the PROs must prove that
their determination of rates is reasonable.132 Consequently, the
judicial determination is often a complicated task:
The challenges of [determining a fair market rate for
a blanket music license] include discerning a rate
that will give composers an economic incentive to
keep enriching our lives with music, that avoids
compensating composers for contributions made by
others either to the creative work or to the delivery
of that work to the public, and that does not create
distorting incentives in the marketplace that will
improperly affect the choices made by composers,
inventors, investors, consumers and other economic
players.133
Additionally, the fact that judicial rate setting is extremely rare
with respect to intellectual property matters does not make the task
any easier, as judges lack analogous standards for rate calculation
and justification.134
A well-established procedure has, however, developed through
recent rate court precedent in proceedings with both PROs.135 To
determine a reasonable fee, the court attempts to make a determination of the fair market value (i.e., “the price that a willing buyer
and a willing seller would agree to in an arm’s length transaction.”).136 Each party sets forth a benchmark and the court assigns
a rate by considering factors such as: the parties’ comparability, the
comparability of the rights in question, and the similarity in economic circumstances affecting each party and the earlier litigants
132

See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15.
See In re Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Pandora II), 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (quoting MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also MOBITV, https://www.mobitv.com
[http://perma.cc/S9U9-7UBF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
134
See Crane, supra note 128, at 312.
135
See Music Choice II, 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no reason why the
approach for determining a BMI license’s reasonable rate should differ from the
procedure for determining an ASCAP rate court case).
136
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc.
(ASCAP v. Showtime), 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1990).
133
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on which they are basing their calculations.137 The issue the court
often faces is that these benchmarks are vastly different.138 The
“most important”139 factor for courts to consider is “the degree to
which the assertedly analogous market under examination reflects
an adequate degree of competition to justify reliance on agreements
that it has spawned.”140 If either party is dissatisfied, the case can
go to the Second Circuit on appeal, where the court will determine
if S.D.N.Y. used an “erroneous standard” by either: (1) relying on
legally impermissible factors; (2) failing to give consideration to
legally relevant factors; (3) applying incorrect legal standards; or
(4) misapplying correct legal standards.141 Three recent rate court
cases have been particularly significant in demonstrating how the
judiciary is setting licensing rates for new media services. In all
three cases, the rate court assigned rates far below what the PROs
ideally requested and provided as their benchmarks.
A. ASCAP Versus MobiTV
MobiTv, Inc. (“MobiTV”) is an entity that purchases programming from cable networks and then transmits it to wireless
carriers so consumers can access the content on mobile devices,
like cellphones and tablets.142 In 2003, MobiTV applied to ASCAP
for a “through-to-the-audience” (“TTTA”)143 blanket license to
137

United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. Civ. 13-95
(WCC), 1993 WL 60687, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 157
F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
ASCAP v. Showtime, 912 F.2d at 577.
141
Id. For example, in Music Choice II, BMI’s benchmark was 3.75% of wholesale
revenue and the S.D.N.Y. rate court set the licensing fee at 1.75% (approximately half of
what the parties had agreed to in their existing contract and half of what BMI had recently
agreed to with a competitor). 316 F.3d. 189, 190 (2003). The Court reasoned that basing
the rate on wholesale revenue was inappropriate. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed
the S.D.N.Y. decision stating, “what retail customers pay to receive the product or
service in question . . . seems to us to be an excellent indicator of its fair market value.”
See id. at 195.
142
See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. MobiTV II,
681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012).
143
Cable networks and over-the-air broadcasters are entitled to seek a TTTA from
ASCAP. The Second Circuit has held that cable program suppliers are “telecasting
networks” within the meaning of ASCAP’s consent decree and are entitled to seek
licenses that cover content transmitted not only to local cable system operators but also
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cover its content, including songs featured in music videos and on
radio-style audio channels.144 The parties were unable to agree on
which revenue base the fee should be calculated, disagreeing over
whether the fee should be based upon the retail revenue received
by the wireless carriers MobiTV contracts with, or the amounts
MobiTV pays to its content providers.145 Further, their benchmark
proposal of the rates to be applied to the revenue base differed by
tens of millions of dollars.146
ASCAP petitioned the rate court in 2008 and both sides presented testimony in support of their respective benchmarks.147
ASCAP argued that the rate should be based on total revenues, including revenue that wireless carriers receive from data plans because consumers are enticed to buy the data plans in order to view
audiovisual content on their mobile devices.148 In support of MobiTV, an expert witness calculated its benchmark based on a fee
established in a comparable proceeding with AOL.149 ASCAP’s
proposal conformed to the traditional three-tiered system used in
traditional TTTA’s in the early 1990s, which is established based
on the music intensity of the programming and classifies it as either
(1) music intensive; (2) general entertainment; or (3) news and
sports.150 MobiTV did not disagree with the three-tiered system,
but argued that the rates should be based on wholesale revenue,
namely what it pays networks for content and receives in return
from wireless carriers to feature its services.151
directly to the viewer. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 782 F. Supp. 778, 808–17 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 956 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1992).
144
See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
145
Id. at 209.
146
Id.
147
ASCAP presented testimony from four of its employees, two expert witnesses and
two composers. MobiTV countered with testimony from five employees and three expert
witnesses. Id. at 210.
148
Id. at 237.
149
The rate court set a fee of 2.5% for an ASCAP blanket license for AOL,
RealNetworks, and Yahoo. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 559 F. Supp. 2d 332, 414–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and remanded, 627 F.3d
64 (2d Cir. 2010).
150
Traditional TTTA licenses are set at rates of 0.9% for “music intensive,” 0.375% for
“general entertainment,” and 0.1375% for “news and sports.” See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp.
2d 206, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012).
151
Id. at 249.
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The Court agreed with both parties and ordered the rates to
follow the three-tiered licensing system, calling it a “ready-made
benchmark.”152 It sided with MobiTV, however, on the issue of
revenue base:
Mobi has shown that the value of the public performance of the music at the retail level is indeed
captured at the wholesale level, not just theoretically by the concept of derived demand, but also functionally from the fact that the cable television networks principally generate their revenues by measuring the number of subscribers for their programming. To the extent that a channel’s content
becomes popular among consumers, the seller of
content demands a higher rate of compensation
from advertisers and from purchasers of the content. And, Mobi’s payments to the cable television
networks for the programming it distributes are driven by the subscriber data that Mobi tracks and
conveys to the networks.153
Although the Second Circuit had previously faulted the rate
court for not relying on retail revenues, it affirmed the ruling in
2012 by reasoning that MobiTV offered services that were sufficiently differentiable from those discussed in prior cases.154 The
Court relied heavily on MobiTV’s expert testimony and disregarded a similar rate it had set between ASCAP and AOL.155 Resultantly, while ASCAP requested $41 million for a six-year licensing
period, the Court awarded only $400 thousand.156
B. BMI Versus DMX
A few years later, the rate court was again faced with a licensing
dispute between a PRO and new media music service. DMX Hold152

Id. at 247.
Id. at 246.
154
Part of the court’s argument was that it would be too difficult to determine what part
of a wireless customer’s fee could account for the music when the total fee was for a
package of both audio and visual programming. See MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76, 86–88 (2d
Cir. 2012).
155
See RAYMOND J. DOWD, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 17:9 (2d ed. 2014).
156
Id.
153
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ings, Inc. (“DMX”),157 a commercial music provider that prepackages programming for sale to a variety of business establishments, applied for an “adjustable-fee blanket license” (“AFBL”)
from BMI for 2005–2012.158 An AFBL differs from a blanket license in that it allows the licensee to reduce its fee by also entering
into direct licensing agreements with songwriters represented in
the PRO’s repertory.159 The license has three components: (1) the
“blanket fee,” which the licensee would pay to the PRO if it did
not enter into any direct licensing agreements; (2) a “floor fee,”
which it would pay even if it directly licensed all of the material
from the PRO’s repertory that it performed; and (3) a “direct license ratio,” which reduces the blanket fee based on the percentage of its total performances of the PRO’s music that is covered by
any direct licenses.160 BMI and DMX were unable to reach an
agreement on virtually all components of the AFBL, including rates
for the blanket fee and the floor fee as well as for the scope of performances to include in the direct license ratio.161
The parties presented “strikingly different” benchmarks: BMI
proposed a blanket fee of $41.81 per location whereas DMX proposed $11.32.162 BMI based its benchmark on the rate of its traditional blanket license with Muzak, DMX’s main competitor, which
was set at approximately $41.163 DMX calculated its benchmark
157

DMX serves business establishments such as retailers, hotels, casinos and fitness
centers. See About Us, DMX, http://www.dmx.com/about [http://perma.cc/BUS7RVAY] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). DMX was acquired by Mood Media Corporation on
March 20, 2015. See DMX Acquired by Mood Media Corporation, DMX (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.dmx.com/images/DMX_Mood_Acquisition_Announcement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VDY7-CXU2].
158
Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc. (BMI v. DMX I), 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
159
Id. at 355. The rate court did not have to determine whether DMX was entitled to
the AFBL because it previously held that BMI was required to provide it to licensees as an
alternative to the blanket license. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168,
171 (2d Cir. 2001).
160
The blanket fee represents the maximum in the range of potential fees to be paid to
BMI and the floor fee represents the minimum. BMI v. DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355–
56.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 357.
163
BMI also had similar agreements with other competitors ranging from $41 to $45 per
location. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc. (BMI v. DMX II), 683 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir.
2012).
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using several factors.164 DMX had entered into more than 550 direct licensing agreements with music publishers, including major
players Sony and Universal, at $25 per location.165 DMX argued
that $10 of each direct licensing agreement represented music
present in BMI’s repertory.166 Subtracting the $10 from the perlocation fee, and then applying a proposed floor fee of 11.7%, resulted in a $11.32 per location rate.167
The rate court decided that DMX’s calculation reflected a
more appropriate benchmark and set the AFBL at $18.91 per location for the blanket fee and $8.66 per location for the floor fee, with
the direct license ratio to be calculated “using DMX’s off-premises
performances as a proxy for all of its performances.”168 The
Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, reasoning that the disparity between rates set by the rate courts and the rates PROs have historically obtained in similar agreements, “is of no moment given
ASCAP and BMI’s longstanding market power and the industry’s
changing economic landscape.”169 Despite the fact that BMI presented evidence that various other agreements with DMX’s main
competitors were set at the $41 to $45 range and negotiated independently, the rate court held that these were not reasonable
benchmarks because they did not reflect a “competitive market.”170 Much like in MobiTV I, the court relied heavily on the music service provider’s proposal as support for its determination and
set a rate less than half of what BMI had requested.171 Consequently, even the interim fees DMX was paying to both ASCAP and
BMI were significantly reduced.172

164

DMX argued it was compensating BMI for two components of the relationship: for
the right to perform works in the repertory, and for BMI’s value in assembling the
repertory and offering a blanket license. See BMI v. DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 367.
169
BMI v. DMX II, 683 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2012).
170
See CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT LAW § 11:28 (2015).
171
See Carly Olson, Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In Re THP, 10
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 283–84 (2012).
172
See Todd Brabec, The Performance Right—A World in Transition, 31 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. 37, 38 (Winter 2015).
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C. In re Pandora Media, Inc.
Pandora, a customized Internet radio service, requested a
TTTA blanket license from ASCAP for the period of 2011–2015.173
In September 2011, the parties agreed to an interim rate of 1.85% of
revenue as they continued negotiating.174 During the course of negotiations, however, an unprecedented event occurred. EMI, one
of the largest music publishers at the time,175 warned it was considering withdrawing entirely from ASCAP in order to increase efficiency by only using one institution for all digital licensing purposes.176 Out of fear of losing EMI’s business, ASCAP modified its
Compendium177 to permit members to withdraw their rights to licensed works in new media.178 ASCAP justified the decision based
on the fact that licensees only needed to obtain both a public performance license and a sound recording license when dealing with
rights in new media.179 ASCAP also offered to handle the administrative side of collecting royalties for any member withdrawing its
digital rights, given that the PRO already distributes royalties from
similar licenses and has one of the lowest operating ratios in the
United States.180 Ten days after the modification’s enactment,
EMI both withdrew its digital rights and entered into an adminis-

173

See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); About Pandora,
PANDORA MEDIA, INC., http://www.pandora.com/about [http://perma.cc/Y9N7-KGJK]
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
174
Pandora pays over half its revenue to record labels for the right to license sound
recordings. See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
175
EMI joined forces with Virgin Records in 2013, becoming “Virgin EMI Records.”
Who We Are, VIRGIN EMI RECORDS, http://www.virginemirecords.com/who-we-are
[http://perma.cc/C76W-BVPZ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
176
See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
177
Id. at 323 (“In addition to operating under a consent decree, ASCAP is governed by
a series of internal rules and contracts. The most important internal rule set for purposes
of this litigation is the ASCAP Compendium. The ASCAP Compendium can be modified
by the ASCAP Board and reflects many of the important rules that govern ASCAP’s
obligations to its copyright holder members and vice versa.”).
178
Id. at 331. ASCAP had never before permitted partial withdrawal of licensing rights.
Id. The modification defined “new media” services transmitting musical compositions
“made available or accessible (i) exclusively by means of the Internet, a wireless mobile
telecommunications network, and/or a computer network and (ii) to the public, whether
or not, in exchange for a subscription fee, other fee or charge.” Id. at 337.
179
Id. at 333.
180
Id. at 337–38.
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tration agreement with ASCAP.181 Pandora immediately negotiated
with EMI for a licensing rate of 1.85% of its revenue, the same rate
as Pandora’s interim agreement with ASCAP.182
In July 2012, Sony also notified ASCAP that it would be withdrawing its digital rights.183 Knowing Pandora could not survive
without its catalogue of music,184 Sony argued in negotiations that
if the company could pay fifty percent of its revenues to record labels for sound recording licenses, it should be paying more for musical works.185 The parties negotiated a one-year deal for Sony’s prorata share of an industry-wide rate of five percent.186
When a third major publisher, Universal Music Publishing
Group (“UMPG”), announced it would be withdrawing its digital
rights, UMPG demanded an even higher rate—8% of Pandora’s
revenue.187 Pandora eventually reached a six-month agreement
with UMPG, agreeing to pay a rate of 7.5% of its revenue.188
Meanwhile, Pandora had already initiated proceedings against
ASCAP, arguing that the Compendium Modification violated the
terms of its consent decree.189 The district court granted summary
judgment, holding that the terms of the consent decree did not allow ASCAP “the right to permit the partial withdrawals of
rights . . . and thereby acquiesce to a regime in which some music
users could not obtain full public performance rights to works in
the ASCAP repertory.”190 Consequently, EMI, Sony, and
UPMG’s withdrawal of new media rights became inoperative.191
181

Id.
The agreement also included a clause that the rate would decrease to 1.70% if
Pandora could negotiate a better agreement with a catalogue equal in size or larger to
EMI’s. Id. at 340.
183
Id. at 342.
184
In 2012, Sony was the world’s largest music publisher with approximately twentyfive to thirty percent market share. Id. at 342–43.
185
Id. at 343.
186
Id. at 346.
187
See id. at 347.
188
Id. at 350.
189
See In re Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Pandora I), No. 12 Civ. 8035 (DLC), 2013 WL
5211927, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
190
Id. at *7.
191
See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 350–51. BMI followed ASCAP’s lead and
modified its terms to allow members to withdraw their digital rights in 2013. See Broad.
182
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In the rate court proceeding, ASCAP proposed a rate of 1.85%
of the revenue for 2011–2012, 2.50% for 2013, and 3.00% for 2014–
2015.192 Pandora countered with a flat rate of 1.70% for all five
years.193 Judge Cote, ASCAP’s rate court judge, set the rate at
1.85% for all five years, holding that if ASCAP felt the rate was reasonable for the first two years, “there is a presumption that that
rate will continue to be a reasonable rate for the entire license period.”194
In all three cases, the rate court declined to use the benchmarks
put forth by the PROs.195 ASCAP pointed out, on appeal to the
Second Circuit in its rate-setting trial with Pandora, that Universal
Music, Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music had all independently
negotiated direct license deals in excess of the judicially set rate of
1.85%.196 Apple also negotiated a higher rate directly with ASCAP
for its iTunes radio license.197 Nevertheless, these independently
negotiated licenses were not deemed reflective of “arms-length
willing buyer and willing seller agreements,” as ASCAP argued,
and the Second Circuit confirmed the 1.85% rate.198
III. PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE PRO CONSENT DECREES
The music industry’s technological landscape is undeniably different today than it was at the turn of the century.199 Notable milesMusic, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc. (BMI v. Pandora), No. 13 CV. 4037 (LLS), 2013 WL
6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013). Pandora also challenged the modification and
the Court ruled in the same manner as it did for ASCAP’s case, reasoning BMI’s consent
decree forbade the PRO from allowing partial withdrawal of rights. See id. at *4.
192
See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 320.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 355.
195
See Brabec, supra note 172, at 39, 40.
196
Id. at 40.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 39, 40; see also Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73, 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2015).
199
See generally Callie Taintor, Chronology: Technology and the Music Industry,
FRONTLINE (May 27, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
music/inside/cron.html [http://perma.cc/QD6V-ES85]; Rob Wile, Watch the American
Music Industry Splinter into Bits over 30 Years in 30 Seconds, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 21,
2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/music-industry-evolution-chart-20148 [http://perma.cc/8LUE-YM8N].
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tones include both the introduction of Apple’s iPod, which has
been purchased more than 300 million times worldwide,200 and the
advent of Internet radio, which is becoming increasingly pervasive
as a form of music distribution.201 Popular services such as iTunes
Radio, Pandora, and Spotify provide music consumers with access
to vast libraries of songs, available through computers, tablets, and
cell phones alike.202 Music is more accessible today than ever before, as online streaming services facilitate worldwide song sharing
with relative ease and speed. Ironically, while the technological advances have created vast sources of revenue for both recording artists and record companies, the same cannot be said for songwriters.
As previously discussed in the Introduction of this Note, Linda
Perry, the songwriter behind Christina Aguilera’s hit song, “Beautiful,” only made a few hundred dollars despite the song playing
tens of thousands of times over Pandora.203 Perry’s experience is
just one of countless stories of compensation inequality with respect to new media royalties. Aviici’s hit, “Wake Me Up!” is the
most streamed song in Spotify history as well as the thirteenth
most played song on Pandora.204 Despite the hit’s vast popularity,
the work’s three songwriters have each made less than five thousand dollars in domestic royalties since the song’s release in
2013.205
200

See Jordan Crook, Apple Has Sold 300 Million iPods in Ten Years, 45 Million Just Last
Year, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 4, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/04/apple-has-sold300-million-ipods-in-ten-years-45-million-just-last-year [http://perma.cc/2BMF-DM7Z].
201
See The Infinite Dial 2014, EDISON RES., http://www.edisonresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/InfiniteDial2014-18-34-and-18-49-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G82C-CPHV] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015) (finding that 66% of 18–34
year-olds in the United States listened to an online radio streaming service in
January/February 2014; also finding Pandora was the most well known of the Internet
radio services surveyed, with four in five 18–49 year-olds answering they were “aware” of
Pandora).
202
See About Pandora, supra note 173; About Us, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/
us/about-us/contact [http://perma.cc/D3NC-67ST] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also
Discover, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/music/discover [http://perma.cc/6MT3-B2YF]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
203
See supra note 8.
204
See Aloe Blacc, Streaming Services Need to Pay Songwriters Fairly, WIRED (Nov. 5,
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/aloe-blacc-pay-songwriters [http://perma
.cc/L97R-85FV].
205
See id. As previously mentioned, Pandora pays over half of its revenue to record
companies for licensing sound recordings. Pandora pays over half its revenue to record
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The direct cause of the industry-wide discrepancy in revenue
received by record labels and recording artists in comparison to
songwriters, lies within the DOJ-mandated PRO consent decrees.
BMI and ASCAP’s decrees each last saw reform in 1994 and 2001,
respectively.206 The propensity of new media has created new licensing challenges—challenges that these PROs have been unable
to successfully adapt to due to the increasingly obsolete terms of
their decrees. In order to change the industry standards to ensure
songwriters are adequately compensated, these consent decrees
must undergo comprehensive reform.
A. Reform Rather than Terminate the Decrees
As previously mentioned, the DOJ distinguishes between two
types of consent decrees: “perpetual final judgments,” which do
not have a date of termination, and decrees with “sunset provisions,” which automatically terminate on a certain date.207 This
change in decree logistics was “based on a judgment that perpetual
decrees were not in the public interest” and accordingly, the DOJ
has encouraged modifying or terminating perpetual decrees when
justified by a change in circumstance or the ability to better serve
the public interest.208 The Supreme Court has agreed with the
DOJ, having held that when there is a “significant change in facts
or law,” a consent decree warrants revision and the proposed modification must be “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.”209
When the PROs signed their decrees, vinyl records were the
hot new technology while CDs, which now seem prehistoric in
comparison to the iPod, were still decades from invention.210 There
labels for the right to license sound recordings. See supra note 174. Comparatively, the
ASCAP rate court set the PROs rate at 1.85% of Pandora’s revenue. See supra note 194.
206
See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15.
207
Both ASCAP and BMI’s consent decrees are “Final Judgments” and consequently
can only be modified or terminated in court. See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra
note 94.
208
Id.
209
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 368 (1992).
210
CDs and CD players became available to consumers in 1982. See Hans B. Peek, The
Emergence of the Compact Disc, IEEE COMM. MAG. 16 (Jan. 2010), http://www.research
.philips.com/technologies/projects/cd/pdf/The-Emergence-of-the-CompactDisc_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/7C5E-UXY6].
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has not merely been a “significant change” in technology but rather a complete technological revolution.211 In present times, the
decrees do, however, continue to serve an important competitive
purpose, and as a result should be modified rather than terminated.212 Music licensing is both multi-faceted and incredibly complex, and the PROs work towards ensuring songwriters license
their musical works effectively and efficiently.213 ASCAP and BMI
share ninety percent of the market and resultantly, any entity that
wants to play popular songs without violating copyright law has to
obtain a license from one, or likely both, of these PROs.214 That
power, in and of itself, warrants consumer protection under the
Sherman Act, which prohibits anti-competitive conduct.215 Furthermore, the decrees continue to work well in respect to traditional licensing needs.216 The blanket license, while controversial with
respect to antitrust principles, is a longstanding recognizable need
in the music-licensing marketplace.217 It is how the decrees restrict
211

See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 368; see generally Taintor, supra note 199; Wile, supra note 199.
See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (“[C]onsent decrees
are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms.”). In order for decrees to remain precise and carefully negotiated,
they must be revised based on changes in circumstance and environment—for example,
the technological revolution that has taken place since the PRO consent decrees came
into fruition. See id.
213
As previously mentioned in Part I, it would be logistically impossible for songwriters
to negotiate directly with each entity wanting to play their musical works. Thus, PROs
play a crucial role in ensuring songwriters both get paid for the public performances of
their works and can detect when copyright infringement occurs. See supra note 13.
214
At a Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on March 10, 2015, Mike Dowdle, Vice
President and General Counsel of Bonneville International Corporation, voiced concern
that if the decrees are terminated rather than modified, there will be no mechanism in
place to protect fairness with respect to the potential for anti-competitive conduct. See
John Eggerton, Broadcasters to Senate: Keep ASCAP/BMI Consent Decrees, BROADCASTING
& CABLE (Mar. 10, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washing
ton/broadcasters-senate-keep-ascapbmi-consent-decrees/138663
[http://perma.cc/
K7RG-HVAG].
215
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
216
The propensity of rate court cases discussed in Part II occurred simultaneously to
the introduction of new media services, namely Internet radio. The system remains
unchanged, however, with respect to licensing musical works in traditional mediums: the
circumstances in which the decrees were created to protect.
217
See, e.g., Mary Katherine Kennedy, Blanket Licensing of Music Performing Rights:
Possible Solutions to the Copyright-Antitrust Conflict, 37 VAND. L. REV. 183, 213 (1984)
(discussing the conundrum courts face in “either promoting competition by invalidating
212
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licensing arrangements for new media services that must be taken
into consideration in light of reform.
B. Allow for the Partial Withdrawal of New Media Licensing Rights
New Media streaming royalties represent the most significant
disparity in compensation between songwriters (for licensing the
public performance of musical works) and record companies (for
licensing sound recordings).218 In an attempt to remedy this discrepancy, ASCAP and BMI attempted to modify their terms to allow
members to separately license new media rights.219 Consequently,
they were both deemed to be in violation of their consent decrees.220 A modification allowing for the separate licensing of new
media rights is precisely what the decrees need, however, in order
to effectively adapt to modern music licensing.
The decrees should include a clause that allows members to
maintain traditional licensing agreements with the respective PRO,
but with the potential to withdraw the right to license musical
works in new media.221 Perpetuating an all in/all out rationale, reflected in the courts’ interpretation of the current consent decrees,222 could have a grave impact on the industry. Sony/ATV
Music Publishing has threatened to withdraw from both ASCAP
and BMI if the decrees are not soon modified to allow for partial
blanket licensing systems at the expense of copyright holders, or protecting copyright
holders by upholding potentially coercive blanket licenses at the expense of licensees”).
218
See supra note 11 (describing the difference between songwriters receiving 9.1% for
“mechanical royalties” in comparison to less than 3% for public performance royalties
through streaming in new media).
219
See BMI v. Pandora, No. 13 Civ. 4037 (LLS), 2013 WL 6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2013); In re Pandora I, No. 12 Civ. 8035 (DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
220
See BMI v. Pandora, 2013 WL 6697788, at *9; In re Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at
*7.
221
The definition of “New Media,” as presented by ASCAP in its compendium
modification, is appropriate for use in the proposed partial withdrawal clause. It provided
that “New Media Transmission of musical compositions is made available or accessible
(i) exclusively by means of the Internet, a wireless mobile telecommunications network,
and/or a computer network and (ii) to the public, whether or not, in exchange for a
subscription fee, other fee or charge.” In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
222
See BMI v. Pandora, 2013 WL 6697788, at *4 (holding BMI’s decree prevents partial
rights withdrawal); In re Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *7 (holding ASCAP’s decree
prevents partial rights withdrawal).
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withdrawal.223 A move such as this could threaten the viability of
both PROs, given Sony’s significant market share,224 which in turn
would threaten the livelihood of the individual songwriters and
small publishing houses the PROs represent. These songwriters
and small publishing houses may neither have the capabilities nor
the resources to navigate the logistic and legal intricacies of music
licensing.225 Furthermore, songwriters, unlike recording artists, are
often not famous and do not make added income through activities
such as touring and selling merchandise.226 Additionally, songwriters do not have set salaries and benefits, like workers in other industries, and thus they rely on public performance royalties to
make a living.227 Without songwriters, composers, and publishers,
there would evidently be no new, original songs.
Copyright owners are not restricted to an all in/all out licensing
scheme like the current consent decrees provide for—rather, they
are free to divide, assign, and license their rights either in full or in
part.228 Modifying these decrees will not only make the decrees

223

See Ed Christman, Sony/ATV’s Martin Bandier Repeats Warning to ASCAP, BMI,
BILLBOARD (July 11, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
publishing/6157469/sonyatvs-martin-bandier-repeats-warning-to-ascap-bmi
[http://perma.cc/BT8K-8GDM].
224
See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 342–43 (noting that Sony had an estimated
market share of twenty-five to thirty percent in 2012); see also ASCAP Comment, supra
note 50, at 17 (“Even the largest music publishers lack the information, resources and
experience necessary to negotiate with each of the numerous broadcasters, Internet
services, nightclubs, restaurants, and other users that regularly perform publicly their
copyrighted works.”).
225
ASCAP provided quotations from its members during its rate court trial with
Pandora in support of its efficacy as a PRO. See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 335–36
(noting the “vital role ASCAP plays in protecting writers from the shark-infested waters
of the music business.”). ASCAP is premised on equality between songwriters and
publishers, thus songwriters fear that if publishers start collecting money for traditional
licensing rights, the splits won’t be as fair as they are now (with a 50/50 between
songwriter and publishers). Id. at 336–37.
226
See, e.g., ASCAP CEO Elizabeth Matthews Testifies for Senate Judiciary Subcommittee,
MARKETWIRED (Mar. 10, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://www.marketwired.com/pressrelease/ascap-ceo-elizabeth-matthews-testifies-for-senate-judiciary-subcommittee1999036.htm [http://perma.cc/GQ4U-J5GK].
227
Id.
228
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(d) (2006) (stating that rights afforded to copyright owners
can be transferred separately).
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more attune to modern music licensing but it will also harmonize
the licensing process with federal copyright law.229
Executives from Pandora argue that the same “corporate parents” own many of the biggest publishers and record companies,
thus the discrepancy in payment can be fixed internally, rather than
through licensing reform.230 This argument fails to take into consideration that both ASCAP and BMI represent many smaller entities, including individual songwriters and boutique publishing
houses, both of which would not benefit from the proposed solution.231 Rather, songwriters would have to join a large publisher in
order to ensure adequate compensation, which is simply an unfeasible option for many.232 If Internet radio services are unable to adequately compensate songwriters because the bulk of their revenue
goes towards licensing sound recordings, that is a problem the Internet radio services must solve in order to remain in business.233
Songwriters should not suffer to enable their sound-recording
counterparts to reap the benefits of licensing music through new
media.
C. Create a New PRO Equivalent to SoundExchange for Performance
Rights
Amending the consent decrees to allow for partial withdrawal
of new media rights could allow for the creation of a new PRO—an
entity dedicated solely to collecting and distributing the royalties
generated by performance rights in new media. The DPSRA of
229

Id.
See Bill Donahue, Pandora, ASCAP Spar In Senate Over Streaming Royalties, LAW360
(Mar. 10, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/623498?utm_source=
rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section [http://perma.cc/B5MN-F62V].
231
See, e.g., Whitney Broussard, The Promise and Peril of Collective Licensing, 17 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 21, 24 (2009) (“Generally, there is little overlap between the sound
recording catalog of a major record label and the musical composition catalog of its
publishing affiliate.”).
232
A large music publisher, like Sony, would have no economic justification to
represent a songwriter with, for example, only one published song. In contrast, ASCAP
and BMI operate as non-profits and accept any artist with at least one published work. See
ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15.
233
See Donahue, supra note 230 (Chris Harrison, Vice President of Pandora, testified,
“I understand that the disparity is a motivating factor to seek to modify the consent
decrees, but at the end of the day, if Pandora is paying 50 percent to record labels and the
solution is to pay 50 percent to the publishers, I can’t make that up on volume.”).
230
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1995 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 leveled the
licensing playing field by allowing copyright holders of sound recordings to collect royalties for digital performances.234 A motivation for recognizing the digital performance right was to ensure artists were fairly compensated, as music users increasingly began
streaming music through the Internet, satellite, and cable services
rather than purchasing it.235 The same consideration given to the
digital performance right must now go to songwriters. SoundExchange, a non-profit PRO, was designated by Congress as the sole
entity to collect and distribute digital performance royalties.236 An
analogous entity should emerge to tackle the same needs for
songwriters licensing public performance rights in new media.
Establishing this new PRO could occur in a variety of ways. For
example, SoundExchange could create a new division internally or
spin-off a subsidiary that deals exclusively with performance rights
in new media. Alternatively, ASCAP and/or BMI could put forth
proposals for new entities, be it a sister company or subsidiary,
tasked only with licensing performance rights in new media.237 The
government would then have the authority to examine each potential candidate for the new PRO and select one as the sole entity designated by Congress to collect and distribute the royalties—just as
it did for SoundExchange with respect to digital performance
rights.238
SoundExchange is efficient and effective, likely because “it is
run by the people it pays.”239 Namely, the board consists of nine
recording artist representatives and nine record company representatives.240 Consequently, the non-profit’s operating costs are
low and the payments it distributes to artists have seen an extraordinary growth rate in recent years.241 Further, new media licensing
234

See Michael Huppe, “You Don’t Know Me, but I Owe You Money”: How
SoundExchange Is Changing the Game on Digital Royalties, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 5
(2010).
235
Id. at 4.
236
Id. at 5.
237
The consent decrees would, of course, have to be amended accordingly to allow this.
238
See Huppe, supra note 234, at 5.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
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is differentiable from traditional mediums in the sense that a readymade system exists for tracking performances: digital technology.
The system SoundExchange employs for tracking song plays (or
something substantively similar) can have the same positive effect
for licensing musical works as it has had for licensing sound recordings.242 Creating an analogous non-profit PRO with the same principles (such as being staffed by both songwriters and music publishers as well as utilizing existing play-tracking technology) but
geared entirely towards performance rights, could ensure the gap in
compensation inequality between recording artists and songwriters
is appropriately bridged.243
This graphic demonstrates the licensing system as it stands:

242

SoundExchange functions by collecting “tens of millions of lines of data” reported
and processed monthly to track when songs have been played through digital services. See
Our Work, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/our-work
[http://perma.cc/485A-ASWJ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015); see also Huppe, supra note
234, at 6 (“SoundExchange does not invoice services. Rather, the organization relies on
services to provide data about what they’ve played and uses these playlists to divide and
distribute royalties according to what’s been played.”).
243
See Drew B. Hollander, “Why Can’t We Be Friends?” How Congress Can Work with
the Private Sector to Solve the “Digital Sampling Conundrum,” 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 229,
272 (2014) (noting the efficacy of SoundExchange with respect to monitoring digital
media royalty payments and proposing a similar system for monitoring “digital
sampling”).
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This graphic indicates how the system would change with a
new PRO designated solely for licensing performance rights in new
media:

D. Replace the Rate Courts with Arbitration
Creating a new PRO may help with new media licensing concerns, but it won’t change the system as it stands with respect to
traditional licensing. Although this Note has proposed modifying
rather than terminating the consent decrees as they apply to traditional media licensing, one part of the current system must change:
the rate courts. As representatives for BMI aptly wrote in the
PRO’s public comments to the DOJ, the rate court system is “too
slow, too expensive, and too legalistic to keep up with the speed of
change in real-world markets today.”244
The judiciary is not the appropriate venue for rate setting, particularly with respect to intellectual property licensing.245 Not only
244

BMI Comment, supra note 51, at 2. ASCAP similarly called the rate court system
“unduly costly and time consuming.” ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 22–23.
245
See Crane, supra 128, at 307 (“Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor
rate regulators.”); see, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001)
(referring to rate setting as “a task [courts] are inherently unsuited to perform
competently”); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
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is such a process extremely rare with respect to intellectual property, “Courts are not institutionally equipped to study a firm’s cost
structure in detail and figure out the difference between confiscatory, reasonable, and excessive rates.”246 The government has itself
analogously argued that judicial rate setting is inappropriate with
respect to patents, reasoning that judicial regulation of the industry
is “incompatible with our system of free enterprise.”247
Rate court determinations are based on precedent rather than
market force and consequently do not accurately reflect the fair
market value of music.248 Neither consent decree defines the term
“reasonable,” and thus the procedure for determining reasonable
rates has evolved as a “flawed judicial mechanism.”249 Essentially,
courts are making a best guess as to the value of music.250 The period during which ASCAP and BMI modified their decrees to allow
for partial withdrawal was the first time in decades that negotiations reflected a willing-buyer/willing-seller transaction on the
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The federal courts generally are unsuited to
act as rate-setting commissions.”); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting “judicial oversight of pricing policies [that] would place
the courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission.”).
246
Crane, supra 128, at 313.
247
See Brief for the United States at 42, United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319
(1947) (No. 89).
248
Rate court determinations are often backward-looking rather than forward-looking.
Instead of contemplating new market trends and evolving business circumstances, rates
are based on past judicial decisions and agreements—all of which have been negotiated in
conjunction with the rate court system. See, e.g., Joan M. McGivern, A Performing Rights
Organization Perspective: The Challenges of Enforcement in the Digital Environment, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 631, 635 (2011). Consequently, the reflected rates are circular and an
ill-suited representation of actual market value. This has lasting effects as the consent
decrees require the PROs to license similar users with similar fees. Nor does it translate
well to new media services, where the industry is constantly changing and businesses
strive to create unique technological services. Offering comparable licenses may be
justifiable for traditional mediums, but not for new media services which are constantly
evolving. P.F. Chang’s, for example, uses music in the same way The Olive Garden does,
but does Pandora offer an experience in exactly the same way as Spotify? The comparison
of “similarity” is more complicated when it comes to new media services. Id.
249
Frederick C. Boucher, Blanket Music Licensing and Local Television: An Historical
Accident in Need of Reform, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1157, 1178 (1987) (arguing the rate
courts are “contrary to the purpose of copyright and antitrust laws” and are “a costly,
cumbersome, and artificial substitute for a free market determination of the value of
music”).
250
Id.
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open market.251 The negotiations between Pandora and Sony, for
example, demonstrated that licensing musical works in new media
is a truly competitive business, worthy of reflective rates.252 Record
companies and recording artists are amassing a fortune through
licensing sound recordings while at the same time, songwriters
struggle to make a living—all because finders of fact, rather than
the open-market, determine their licensing rates.253 Furthermore,
while licensees await rate court determinations (which often take
years for litigation preparation, trial and appellate review), the licensees reap the benefits of “interim fees” which are set by the
court based on any previous agreements between the parties.254
The process incentivizes litigation, as licensees are free to abide by
interim agreements and avoid negotiating while awaiting a judicial
determination of the fee.255 Each day licensees and PROs wait for a
judicial determination of reasonable fees is another day songwriters
aren’t getting adequately compensated.256 Thus, a solution to this
problem is to replace the rate court system with binding, expedited
arbitration.
Arbitration tribunals, unlike the rate court system, can adapt to
meet time-sensitive deadlines by modifying and specifically tailor-

251

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
253
Both consent decrees provide that once the rate court has determined a “reasonable
fee,” the PRO must “offer a license at a comparable fee” to all other similar applicants
who thereafter request a license. See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 15; BMI
Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 9.
254
See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that the rate court will fix
an interim fee within ninety days of a licensee’s written request for a license); BMI
Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 12 (stating that the rate court will fix an interim fee
within 120 days of a licensee’s written request for a license).
255
See McGivern, supra note 248, at 632 (discussing how the consent decrees allow
licensees to delay paying PROs until the rate court has set a reasonable fee and
rhetorically asking, “Why is ASCAP barred from exercising what is a copyright owners’
normal right to sue for infringement if usage and payment terms have not been agreed
upon?”).
256
See, e.g., ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 24 (noting that some licensees have
remained on interim licenses for decades while awaiting rate court rulings); BMI
Comment, supra note 51, at 20 (whilst awaiting rate court decisions, “many music users
are able to perform BMI music for years without paying BMI, and it is not unheard-of for
a user to go out of business before paying even a dime to BMI for its use of music”).
252
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ing procedure.257 This is particularly attractive in commercial disputes, such as music licensing negotiations, as both parties benefit
from a quick determination of fees so the business relationship can
proceed accordingly.258 Abiding by an expedited arbitration process
could also eliminate the need for interim fees, thereby simplifying
the exchange of funds between parties. Although an argument exists that the number of rate court trials has not been substantial
enough to amount to replacing the system, a number of proceedings have been terminated through settlements prior to litigation.259
The expenses and time spent on these proceedings is nevertheless
significant—particularly on behalf of the PRO who is likely engaged in various other negotiation disputes and settlements concurrently.260
A troubling aspect about recent rate court decisions, such as
the three discussed in Part II, is the disparity in defining “reasonable” with respect to determining rates. Although the accepted
precedent is to set a rate that represents “fair market value,” the
rate court in In re Pandora I rejected examples of direct licenses as
appropriate benchmarks and set the rate significantly below what
other similar parties have reached through negotiation.261 Rejecting
direct licenses as evidence of fair market value and consequently
setting lower rates in the courtroom than in the open market incen257

See DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON, JUDITH GILL & MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON
ARBITRATION 1:5 (23d ed.).
258
The Arbitration Act establishes federal policy favoring arbitration, particularly with
respect to commercial disputes. See 9 U.S.C. § 1; see, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346,
128 (2008) (“National policy favoring arbitration applies in state as well as federal
courts.”); Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). The DOJ
also supports arbitration in commercial disputes, particularly in technologically evolving
industries. See, e.g., United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148 (D.D.C.
2011) (the DOJ suggested non-appealable arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure for
a decree enjoining a broadcaster and cable network from entering in a joint venture to
provide video programming).
259
See ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 24 (“There have in fact been a substantial
number of rate court proceedings that have been terminated by settlement after
significant expenses have been incurred in preparation for rate court litigation.”); see also
Brabec, supra note 172, at 37 (detailing rate court cases that have terminated by
settlement, the details of which are almost always kept confidential).
260
See Brabec, supra note 172, at 37.
261
Despite evidence of direct licensing agreements reaching up to three percent of
revenue, the Court set Pandora’s ASCAP rate at 1.85%. See In re Pandora I, No. 12 Civ.
8035 (DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
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tivizes parties to rely on the judiciary rather than negotiate amongst
themselves. In the interest of both judicial economy and inherent
fairness to songwriters, the licensing process for musical works in
new media must change. Allowing expedited, binding arbitration to
replace the rate court system will result in awards that mold the
market and significantly improve the rate-setting process.
CONCLUSION
ASCAP and BMI are currently bound by consent decrees that
have not evolved to suit the modern music industry. The technological dissemination of music is vastly different than it was when the
PROs entered into their decrees and the industry has evolved, and
continues to do so, at a rapid pace. Allowing outdated agreements
to govern music licensing not only harms songwriters, but also the
interests of the public at-large. The benefits of music are globally
pervasive—songs can inspire happiness, encourage unity, and even
support both mental and physical healing. If songwriters are not
adequately compensated for their work, they will not be able to
continue producing it. The Supreme Court has said, “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”262 Recording artists and record labels saw justice with the creation of digital
performance rights, which had a lasting positive impact on the industry. A similar change must now occur with respect to licensing
performance rights in new media. By burdening songwriters with
financial uncertainty, the consent decrees stifle creativity rather
than stimulate it. Amending the decrees to allow for partial withdrawal of new media rights, creating a new PRO, and replacing the
rate courts with expedited, binding arbitration will reform the system to its benefit. The industry has evolved and so now must the
decrees.
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Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

